# *JAPAN'S CHANGING ROLE AND THE FUTURE OF US FORWARD PRESENCE IN NORTHEAST ASIA: CONTEXT, OPTIONS, AND OPPORTUNITIES*

**Jay M. Parker**

## INTRODUCTION[1]

On 10 November 2001, almost 60 years to the day after the Imperial Japanese Navy sortied from the homeland to attack Pearl Harbor, ships from the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force sailed for the Indian Ocean to join the US Navy and other allied forces in the war against terrorism. This deployment of forces was a major step for Japan, following intense debate in the Japanese Diet.[2] Like many other nations, Japan shared the sense of threat from a global terrorist movement. Unlike other nations, Japan had constitutionally constrained its ability to combat such threats.

More than half a century of formal rejection of security policy options considered normal and essential by other states produced a deeply ingrained national sense of pacifism. Despite the dramatic shock of the September 11th attacks, some in Japan still clung to the most restrictive traditional post-war views of self-defense. Even a recent series of armed clashes between Japanese ships and vessels suspected to be from North Korea set off a fierce public debate over Japan's right to defend itself in its own territorial waters. Mindful of public opinion, some of Japan's leaders worked to hedge their commitment to the war against terrorism.[3]

This deployment of Japanese forces marks another in a series of recent shifts in Japan's defense posture. After the embarrassment of Japan's ambiguous efforts to join the international coalition protecting its clear economic interests in the

Gulf War, the Japanese made a series of small, halting steps towards greater participation in international peacekeeping. They reaffirmed, restructured, and revitalized the Defense Guidelines linking them to the United States. But while many in Japan—and many of Japan's neighbors—oppose a robust Japanese security posture, for some in Japan and the United States these steps are still not enough. Japan, it is argued, must accept the normal national security responsibilities expected of any nation.

Does this recent commitment of Japan's Self Defense Force represent a bold and irreversible step toward greater military self reliance, or is this another in a long series of incremental, ambiguous, and reversible actions aimed at balancing domestic demands and external pressures?[4] And, if this does represent a lasting change in Japan's defense posture, what does that mean for America's forward military presence in East Asia?

The near-term prospects[5] for America's continuing role in the security and stability of Northeast Asia can only be effectively analyzed in light of Japan's likely security posture and the context of related regional issues and events. Even before September 11th, almost daily events in and between virtually every nation in the region highlighted the continuing United States presence. In the past decade the domestic politics of Japanese national security, the dramatic if erratic momentum toward Korean rapprochement, the re-emergence of China as a regional hegemon, and America's continuing reassessment of its global role have all combined to heighten attention to the future of American policy in East Asia.

This study reviews several specific security scenarios for Northeast Asia, examines the possible roles for all nations in the region, and concludes that in the near term Japan's domestic

political and economic weaknesses combine with regional political dynamics to provide a significant, continuing US diplomatic and military presence.

There are several fundamental assumptions made in this study. The first is that any premise of a unilateral American role in the region is inherently flawed. America's future in Northeast Asia can only be explained, described, predicted, and prescribed in the complex context of domestic politics within and interaction between the other nations of the region. Therefore, this paper will deliberately reverse the practice of discussing America's role at length while discussing broader regional dynamics at the margins.

The next assumption is that the presence of conventional military forces forward deployed in theater can and should be considered distinct from considerations of strategic or theater-based missiles defenses. Clearly missiles (both strategic and theater) and conventional forces are integrated parts of a military force continuum. However, each possesses deterrent and responsive capabilities uniquely suited for specific types of threats, and each needs to be assessed separately.[6] This paper will focus primarily on conventional military forces. Furthermore, this paper focuses more specifically on forces deployed to contribute to the defense and security of the region as opposed to those forward based for use in out of sector missions.

Related to this assumption is the argument that discussing military presence without noting political, social, and economic factors is, at best, a partial solution. The factors most likely to either trigger war or foster peace in Northeast Asia are not rooted in comparative military capabilities or troop placement. Instead,

military capabilities and troop placement are inseparable from political, social, and economic factors. [7]

Despite the hyperbole of the late 1980's, this paper assumes that Japan is a nation severely weakened by its continuing inability to restore economic order and stability. Most of those who used to facetiously state that "The Cold War is over and Japan won" now recognize the reality of Japan's precarious economic position. This combined with a slow response to needed domestic political reforms has greatly diminished Japan's hopes for sustained regional (let alone global) hegemony.[8] Furthermore, any proposals for assuming a more substantive security role must overcome the unique Japanese brand of national pacifism that blocks the required Constitutional revisions.[9]

Next, while full, peaceful Korean reunification will certainly not occur in the short term, there will be continuing engagement between the two Koreas resulting eventually in some form of permanent, stable reunification. Movement toward that eventual reconciliation proceeds at a far slower pace than had been previously expected. The optimism evident at the height of Kim Dae-Jung's "Sunshine Policy" is clearly gone. The recent North Korean response to selection as part of the "axis of evil" was a setback to US relations with both Koreas. Nevertheless, progress, however glacial, continues. [10]

Meanwhile the nearly complete unraveling of the North Korean economy has not brought the anticipated collapse of the regime nor does such a collapse appear likely in the near term. Given all this, the reasons for stationing forces on the Korean Peninsula have not been fundamentally altered. However, growing domestic pressure in South Korea has undermined the

consensus for maintaining a United States presence and a number of actions have taken place over the past decade to reduce the visibility of the American footprint.

This study also assumes that tensions between Taiwan and the mainland will continue. The decades-long brinkmanship between Beijing and Taipei remains a reflection of domestic politics in each capital as much if not more than it has in years past. Furthermore, some of the current tensions are also fueled by domestic politics in the United States. Despite these tensions the immediate likelihood of armed conflict is not high. This is significant to the US-Japan relationship because Japan has struggled to avoid being caught in the Beijing-Taipei conflict for reasons rooted as much in Japan's recent colonial past as in Japan's general strategic isolation.[11]

A further assumption is that the recent reemergence of China in its traditional role as regional hegemon is the result of the uncertain dynamics of China's internal economic and political modernization. It is not the result of a deliberate, aggressive policy of territorial or political expansion. Furthermore, the most significant bases for current political tensions with the United States are rooted in China's domestic policy, not its foreign or defense policies.[12] While an understandable rebuttal to this assumption would be to point out the conflicts with Taiwan and Tibet, it is important to remember that despite the perceptions of other nations, the PRC considers Taiwan and Tibet to be internal domestic issues.

This paper also assumes that the continued presence of American forces in Northeast Asia is not a unilateral decision made at the discretion of the US military. Civilian political

leaders, not the Pentagon, make American troop basing policies. Such decisions have significant political and economic implications beyond the scope and authority of military leaders whose power is limited to recommending and implementing such policies.[13]

Next, while the United States could unilaterally choose to withdraw forces from anywhere in the region, it would not likely do so without giving consideration to the severe diplomatic consequences. Such a dramatic action would seriously reflect on other American commitments around the world. Needless to say, any attempts to station troops overseas without host nation consent would be, at the most extreme, tantamount to an act of war. While the United States does not have unconstrained, unilateral power to station or withdraw forces from overseas bases, host nations do have the power to evict. When they do—as was the case in France in the 1960's, Thailand in the 1970's, and the Philippines in the 1980's—the United States must and will comply.

## BACKGROUND

Ever since the Spanish-American War and the subsequent capture and colonization of the Philippines, there has been a constant American military presence in East Asia. For more than a century, the US forces forward based on Asian soil have carried out a variety of roles ranging from deterrent presence to the prosecution of total war. Like the briefer but far more visible US military role in Europe, American military presence in Asia has been an extension of America's broader foreign policy aimed at securing and advancing US national economic and political interests.[14]

However, unlike the American presence in Europe, the United States military in Asia has not consistently been part of broader multilateral efforts based on formal security alliances such as NATO. Instead, the United States has carried out its Asian security policies bilaterally or at times unilaterally. During times of war in Asia the US has placed its efforts under the umbrella of multilateral alliances. Between the wars those alliances ceased to play a primary role in the development and execution of US policy. Indeed, one could argue that even while part of formal alliance structures for the purposes of waging war, America's role was clearly assumed to be "first among equals."

The distinction between the traditional United States military role in Europe and the traditional American military role in Asia is important as one assesses the likely future. The prospects for a reunified Korea or the less immediate but certainly no less important peaceful resolution of the Taiwan-PRC relationship would alter the security landscape of Asia at least as much as the fall of the Berlin Wall altered Europe. However, while US forces remain in Europe after the dramatic events of the past decade, it is dangerous and naïve to assume a prolonged status quo for American forces in Asia.[15]

A number of important, closely linked factors affect the future presence of the United States military in Asia. First is the traditional pattern of hegemony and power in East Asia, in sharp contrast to the European model. Simply stated, classic European balance-of-power politics do not fully apply to Northeast Asia. Consequently, assessments of East Asian international relations rooted in mainstream Realist International Relations literature are often flawed. Furthermore, most policy analysis and decision

making is often unconsciously a product of this same Eurocentric view of diplomacy and security.[16]

For example, European diplomacy (and much of the scholarly literature that draws on European cases) is premised on multiple competing nations with roughly comparable but constantly shifting relative capabilities. These states either balance or bandwagon based on capabilities and their perceptions of threats. The result is constantly shifting patterns of conflict and alliance over the course of many centuries. [17]

Many of the states in Europe emerged as coherent political entities after centuries of internal struggle. State identities were sometimes geo-politically blurred by patterns of cross-border alliances and cultural affinities. We think of this as ancient history. However, it is worth noting that Italy and Germany were not unified modern states until late in the last century, Britain was not always the United Kingdom and still must contend with internal separatist movements, and many Central European states were manufactured, destroyed, then resurrected many times over. Complicating this were patterns of alliances built or reinforced by intermarriages among royal leaders. While this was meant to bring peace, more often it brought new conflicts, some more deeply personal than political or diplomatic. World War I was, among other things, a war between cousins.[18]

Northeast Asia's patterns of international politics emerged far differently. Rather than several competing potential hegemons, China has been the one consistent hegemon dominating the region culturally as well as politically for thousands of years. Furthermore, this hegemony was not exercised through military conquest and occupation but through the unique system of tribute

and cultural integration. There is no comparable example from European history.

While the patterns of foreign policy in Europe reflected constant interaction and expansion, the patterns in Northeast Asia reflected isolation. The greatest threats and conflicts were internal. This had also been true in parts of Europe during the feudal era; however, there was no comparable Asian example of the kinds of religious and ideological battles that spanned national and ethnic boundaries. Asian states did not engage in the kinds of formal balancing and alliance behavior that dominated Europe well into the modern era and continues to dominate today. Asian internal conflicts also stayed largely internal. Europe's prevalent patterns of diplomacy and intermarriage to gain domestic political advantage were not mirrored in Asia.[19]

The most serious threat to these traditional patterns emerged in the 19th Century as European imperial intervention coincided with the domestic weakness and vulnerability of China. Seizing on the opportunity provided by Perry's visits and mindful of China's example, Japan emerged from its isolation. The traditional Asian order collapsed. The Japanese quickly filled the vacuum left by the demise of China's hegemony. The adaptation of Western patterns of imperial behavior quickly brought Japan into the select group of the world's most powerful nations. Within less than a century, this form of European imperial order had the same disastrous consequences for Asia that it ultimately had for Europe.

In the post-World War II era, the traditional power patterns in Asia re-emerged and remain in the contemporary structure of existing regional relationships. Specifically, relationships

between states are bilateral rather than multilateral. Now, however, the hegemon is America. Acting in the role of an offshore balancer, the United States assumes China's traditional role as the hegemon dominating bilateral relationships. Meanwhile relationships between states in Asia reflect more than a century of bitter conflicts that have not been fully resolved.

Unlike the European post-war experience, there is no NATO or EU style framework to provide for future resolution of conflicts. During the Cold War, the United States was able to either ignore or capitalize on Asian bilateral conflicts as a means of advancing its short-term regional interests and its larger, long-term global Cold War interests. In so doing, the United States often ignored the specific regional context. The preferred American lens for viewing international politics has been European rather than Asian.

With the end of the Cold War, American policy required reassessment. That is not to say that the Cold War has, in fact, ended. This widespread belief is a continuation of traditional American Eurocentricity. While the European chapter of the Cold War appears to have drawn to a close (or, in the minds of some more cautious observers, taken a brief sabbatical), a Cold War still continues in East Asia. In fact, significant elements of the Cold War differ from Europe to Asia. Despite the fact that the United States viewed its Cold War actions in Asia as an extension of its actions in Europe, these were two very different wars. [20]

As the new century begins, the nations in East Asia and the United States reassess their security roles in the region. In that reassessment, there are a number of potential misperceptions. Some are already evident in public discussions. The primary

misperceptions relate to Chinese capabilities and intentions. Speculation about PRC offensive military power and likely courses of action does not always match actual military strength. The greatest danger is an overestimation of PRC military strength and intent, followed by a buildup by other nations in response to a threat that is little more than speculation. In addition to endangering regional stability, this fuels internal domestic conflicts in China.[21]

An equally dangerous misreading is the assumption that Japan can be viewed as a balancing power rather than a threat. This is primarily an issue for American policy makers urging revision of the Japanese "peace" Constitution and modernization of the Japanese Self Defense Force. The perceived rearming of Japan stirs fears in Korea and China and reinforces hard-liners, particularly those in China suspicious of economic and political modernization at the expense of defense spending.[22]

A clearly related issue is the continuing inability of Japan to officially come to terms with recent history. As recently as summer 2001, Japan failed to effectively deal with regional furor caused by the perennial conflict over the treatment of Japan's aggressive past in government-approved history texts. Added to this was the outcry over debate in Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's cabinet about conducting official visits to Yasukuni Shrine, official resting place of the spirits of Japan's war dead to include several executed war criminals. Attempts to sidestep the controversy by wordsmithing and "spinning" the nature of the visits only fueled regional anger and domestic cynicism.[23]

The recurring failure to deal with the recent past has two consequences. One is the continuing mistrust by those who

experienced Japanese aggression. Much of this mistrust is genuine while some is cynically generated for domestic political purpose. Regardless of its foundation, this mistrust greatly complicates the likelihood for regional security cooperation. The second consequence is domestic. Without a realistic view of their own history, the Japanese are hard pressed to build an effective domestic consensus on security issues. The quasi-official toleration of outspoken nationalists and historical revisionists only serves to highlight the problem and delay resolution.[24]

A seldom-mentioned issue is the likelihood that a reunified Korea could be seen as a threat by other nations, particularly Japan. Under any circumstance, the emergence of a new state with a strong sense of nationalism and a large, well-armed, well-trained military would serve to threaten its neighbors. This is even more significant given the recent tragic relationship between Japan and Korea and the failure of Japan to effectively confront its colonial and wartime past.[25]

## THREE SCENARIOS FOR SECURITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA

### Unilateral Independence

Given these assumptions, this background, and current concerns, there are three options currently under debate for structuring security in the region. Each overlap at points, but at their core they are distinct choices with different options and implications for the United States. These options are (1) independent capabilities and non-alignment, (2) multilateral alliance with shared defensive responsibilities and (3) continuation of the status quo with the United States as a balancer and honest

broker, providing the security umbrella through a series of bilateral relationships.

The first option—independent capabilities—requires each nation to develop its own, independent military capabilities without consideration of possible alliances or bilateral arrangements. Under this option military forces are structured in accordance with assessments of specific threats and the limits of national resources. This option can prove deceptive. No nation has truly unlimited resources. One key resource is a nation's limited ability to build and sustain a domestic political consensus for unlimited military spending short of an all out war for national survival. Each of the nations involved in the security of this region has specific limitations on its ability to be a truly independent, unilateral power. Two of these nations—China and the United States—can enjoy relative independence with specific but minor limitations.

However, Japan's security independence is severely constrained. The most obvious constraints are the legal limits imposed by the Japanese Constitution and the related limitations implied by the collective defense arrangement with the United States.[26] In the unlikely event that both of these primary constraints could be lifted, other serious barriers to security independence exist. The first and most formidable is the culture of pacifism that has developed since World War II. Domestic opposition to Constitutional revision and enhanced military capabilities remains high. Even during periods when potential threats might have served to motivate a change in attitudes, political leaders have been unable to move public opinion in the

direction of military modernization, let alone genuine security independence.[27]

In addition to a lack of popular support for revising the status quo, Japan lacks the financial resources to carry out a substantial military buildup. In a little over ten years Japan has gone from the economic envy of the world to a nation trapped in a major recession. Unemployment is on the rise, officials have begun to acknowledge a problem with homelessness, growth has averaged one percent, and financial institutions are burdened with almost unmanageable debts. Despite the initial popularity of Prime Minister Koizumi and his promise of economic reforms (as well as revisions to the security policy) domestic political institutions have proven incapable of responding to this crisis.[28]

One could accept the premises that domestic public opinion has limited effect on Japanese political leaders, that military parity can be achieved with asymmetric high-tech solutions rather than expensive industrial-based weapons systems, and that a military buildup would cause a short-term economic bounce. Under such a scenario Japan could move toward some degree of effective rearmament; however, such a movement is not likely to succeed. Catching up implies that others wait for you. To do so one must presume ignorance and/or paralysis on the part of Japan's neighbors. Inevitably, China would remain one or more steps ahead of Japanese capabilities and the legitimacy of hard liners in China would be further enhanced. Korea—whether divided or reunified—would not sit by idly. South Korean military capabilities already far outstrip those of Japan. Rearmament of Japan would be easily exploited as a popular rationale for sustaining Korean military capabilities even after reunification.

Even if it takes the almost unthinkable step of secretly developing and then announcing nuclear capability, Japan could not successfully establish security independence. It is simply not possible for Japan to get there from here.

For China, the most significant limitation is domestic political consensus. The current regime—even given some periodic conservative retrenchment—is struggling to pursue economic and political modernization. This has meant balancing while maintaining domestic stability (most significantly, elite consensus) with dramatic and often disruptive economic change. This ambitious, high-risk undertaking also requires greater integration into the international community. With increased integration comes increased scrutiny and, inevitably, increased international criticism for a state with a strong sense of cultural superiority combined with a unique history of isolation and regional hegemony.

Closely related to this challenge is the historic Chinese imperative for internal order, stability, and cohesion reflected in what most other nations choose to interpret as international rather than domestic political conflicts. Until September 11th, foremost among these in the minds of most western observers was the conflict over the status of Taiwan. Since then, the threat of Islamic fundamentalism in western China has received significant attention. Regardless of the specific threat, the widely shared domestic demand to maintain national territorial cohesion is reinforced by the remembered costs of failure to do so under the European onslaught in the 19th Century. The legitimacy of the nation's leadership is directly tied to its ability to defend and maintain the nation's geopolitical integrity. While serious

divisions may exist on other domestic political issues, the perceived importance of Taiwan, the western autonomous regions, and Tibet is a view that crosses other political lines.

Short of dramatic provocation (foremost of these being a formal Taiwanese declaration of independence from the mainland), China will not attack. However, China will continue to risk an arms race and international disapproval to ensure that it has the military capability needed to deter national dismemberment. To build and sustain that military capability, China must divert resources from pressing domestic economic needs while raising the concerns and suspicions of other nations. These other nations include those in the region, each of which has at least one unresolved territorial dispute with China.[29]

In a relative sense, China may be the most independent of the nations in the region. This independence is not without serious constraining pressures. These pressures become even more pronounced in a scenario where every other nation in the region seeks an independent security course. The result would easily be the kind of spiraling security dilemma that destabilizes the economy and domestic political order of the entire region. Given the significant share of the global economy tied to this region, such a disruption would be quickly felt around the world.

**Regional Collective Security**

It has been suggested that the best alternative for East Asian security is the building of a regional alliance to provide for collective security. Proponents of this concept look to post-World War II Europe for examples. Under such a proposal, Northeast Asian nations would form a multilateral security arrangement as a means of conflict prevention and resolution. [30]

Such a proposal is hampered for a number of reasons. First, it is inconsistent with the practices and traditions of the region. As noted above, international relations in Northeast Asia have been bilateral rather than multilateral. While Europe has multilateral diplomatic practices and institutions dating back to the Treaty of Westphalia, Northeast Asia has no existing framework. Building such an arrangement from scratch—while certainly a worthy goal—is not likely to achieve immediate results.

Such an arrangement also requires a motivation for action, normally in the form of a threat. What are the possible threats motivating such an alliance in Northeast Asia? Is terrorism by non-state actors a threat? Recent events certainly warrant closer cooperation. However, despite September 11th, there is little in the way of a substantial threat (beyond small, localized groups posing domestic dangers best handled by law enforcement) that might overrule existing barriers to a formal security alliance. Are there major external threats to the region requiring united response? No such threats appear immediately on the horizon. Is there a requirement for in-theater peacetime missions such as peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance beyond the scope of one state's abilities? At present there are no peacekeeping requirements in Northeast Asia, and humanitarian assistance requirements have not appeared to outstrip the capabilities of the states affected. For example, during the Kobe earthquake Japanese government officials not only rejected large-scale assistance from the American military, but tried to oppose or restrict aid from their own Self Defense Force as well.[31]

The perceived threats to the region are from nations within the region. As alliances evolve they may mitigate the potential of

threats from those states within the alliance. Alliances do not form among states that view each other as a danger above all other potential threats. Japan, China, and the two Koreas view each other as threats. It may be an overt fear, as with Japan's growing fear of China. It may be a covert threat, as with Japan's fear of a reunified Korea. It may be an empty but rhetorically useful threat, as with Korea and China's fear of Japan. It may be the collective threat that all states feel from the regions many unresolved territorial disputes. The result is the same. The nations of Northeast Asia do not have the baseline trust necessary to initiate and sustain a multilateral collective security alliance.

A logical alternative would be the creation of bilateral alliances between states. In fact, such alliances already exist between the United States and Japan and the United States and Korea; however, these arrangements are not regional security agreements. They link nations in the region to a nation outside Northeast Asia whose security interests intersect but do not always wholly coincide with their own. To form such alliances within the region would necessitate excluding and, therefore, threatening other nations. Any such alliance would be inherently destabilizing. A Japan-Korea alliance (whether with the ROK or a reunified Korea) would certainly fuel China's fears of encirclement, despite the fact that the two parties to such an agreement would not pose a serious, immediate military threat to the PRC. A Japan-China alliance excluding Korea serves no foreseeable purpose other than to antagonize Korea. An alliance between China and Korea (the most conceivable of all such arrangements) would be superfluous. Either of these two nations

alone is capable of dealing with a military threat from Japan and, in fact, Japan does not threaten either state.

Japan brings three significant impediments to any alliance. The first is its limited military capabilities and the extraordinary domestic political difficulties inherent in attempting to overcome that limitation. Next is its current economic weakness. The largest impediment to any regional alliance involving Japan is that nation's failure to come to acceptable terms with the region's memories of World War II. This is periodically refueled by controversies regarding school textbooks. This dispute is more than a debate about history. To the other nations in the region it is a fundamental barrier to the kind of trust and transparency necessary for any form of alliance.

**Status Quo**

The third option open to the nations of the region is sustaining the status quo. The United States continues to serve as the security umbrella through bilateral defense agreements with Korea and Japan. Each nation operates within the opportunities and constraints of these agreements according to the limits of their existing capabilities, their financial resources, and their domestic political consensus. But while sustaining the status quo may seem the most obvious solution, it is far more obvious that the status quo cannot stand.

Domestic political costs of the existing relationships have increased. The United States-Japan relationship is under pressure despite the initial success of the recent US-Japan Defense Guidelines revisions.[32] In the years immediately following the negotiation of the new guidelines, there was some evidence of an attempt by Japan to adhere to the guidelines while increasing

cooperation with and accommodation to China. Some policy-makers are urging Japan to develop greater military capabilities and flexibility while maintaining close interdependence with the United States. However, greater capabilities and flexibility are likely to encourage domestic demands for greater independence.

The economic and social costs of the recent banking crisis and the optimism brought by the Sunshine Policy have increased domestic political resentment of the American presence in South Korea. The American footprint has already been reduced in Seoul by relocating a number of military bases out of the city. While early hopes for reunification have diminished, the initial public discussions of a post-reunification role for US forces continue.

Despite all this, Korea is clearly the most volatile location in the region. The two neighboring states are still technically at war. There is still widespread famine in North Korea. Armed troops are on hair-trigger alert along the Demilitarized Zone (one of the most inappropriately named locations in the world). Belligerent rhetoric is still the dominant tone of discussions across the 38$^{th}$ parallel (and between the United States and North Korea). Earlier hopes for rapid progress in North-South diplomacy had already been severely challenged when tensions flared again in the wake of President Bush's "axis of evil" speech. The realization that any outbreak of violence on the Korean Peninsula directly threatens all neighboring states has sustained often frustrated diplomatic efforts and involves Japan to a far greater degree than the threat of war over Taiwan.[33]

An often-overlooked dimension of the conflict in Korea is the role of the PRC. While Beijing is routinely assumed to be the staunch ally of North Korea, China has built a substantial

diplomatic and economic relationship with South Korea. Low-level "Track Two" diplomacy and sub rosa trade in the early 1980's provided the early foundation for this relationship. Now trade and diplomatic exchange between the two nations is substantial and above board. China clearly has an interest in the long-term stability of the two Koreas. At the same time, the tragic state of the North Korean economy has created problems for China to include a flow of refugees seeking economic and political asylum. [34]

The most significant change has been in the relationship between China and America. President Bush has reassessed and significantly altered the Clinton Administration's "strategic partnership" between the United States and China. Some of this reassessment can be attributed to US domestic political pressures from those concerned about political and religious rights. The confrontation over a US Navy surveillance aircraft and the tragic accidental bombing of the Chinese diplomatic building in Kosovo demonstrate that the US-China conflict is more than just an ideological debate. This change in the relationship may be less than it seems, however, as the United States and China continue to seek ways to sustain and build on their past diplomacy, particularly in the wake of September 11th. [35]

Clearly, "status quo" is no longer an adequate term to describe the security environment in Northeast Asia. Previous alternatives to the status quo are not a realistic foundation for determining the future of the United States in the region. What, then, is a viable scenario? What role would United States presence in the region play in such a scenario? Is there still a window of opportunity for

US policy makers that can promote the long-term common interests of a prosperous and stable region?

## A FOURTH OPTION

Given all of the above, the central focus of any proposal for the future security architecture of Northeast Asia must center on the reunification of Korea. While this specific goal is clearly in the long-term interest of every nation in the region, it also provides an exceptional opportunity for building broader, multilateral frameworks for future cooperation and stability in the region. To succeed in this daunting task, there are important steps that each nation must take.

The first common step is the recognition of shared dangers and shared opportunities. Next is the realization that this is an economic as well as a military challenge. Finally, there is the common obligation of accepting the long-term responsibilities inherent in reunification. One of the clearest lessons from the reunification of Germany is that the most demanding tasks come after actual reunification. By most estimates the actual costs of reunifying Korea—economic, political, and social—will far exceed the costs of reunifying Germany.

In order to successfully move toward reunification and beyond, each state has specific steps it must take. The primary task for the two Koreas is the continuation of dialogue, no matter how slow or inconclusive the pace might appear to be. In recent years, South Korea has taken primary responsibility for initiating and sustaining this dialogue. Meanwhile, North Korean leaders are torn in conflicting directions. Survival of the nation requires opening one of the world's most isolated societies, reforming and modernizing the economy, and integrating it into the global

economy. Survival of the particular regime in power requires avoiding all these steps. Mindful of the fate of the rulers of East Germany and Communist Romania, North Korean leaders are directly threatened by the very policies they must endorse. Other nations in the region can contribute to bridging this divide through diplomatic intervention and economic development assistance. In the end, resolution of the first steps in true reunification is a Korean responsibility. While awaiting this resolution, there are things other states should and, in some cases, should not do.

One task that each nation should not undertake is the rapid alteration of the current strengths of the region's military. In the near term this includes sustaining the level of American troops. Changes in troop posture can and should be considered as appropriate to reinforce and reward positive steps in the direction of peace and reunification. These changes in posture can include rebasing within the region, but not redeploying troops away from the region. American forces still play a vital role as both a deterrent and as a symbol of commitment. Removing them from the region could trigger a response from other nations that would easily escalate, even if the intent were to replace one-for-one the military capabilities withdrawn by the United States. One US Army division sustained in Korea is far less threatening than comparable military capabilities developed by the Japanese to replace the Americans.

This in turn highlights the important task for Japan. Before it can contribute a viable force to the region's security it must have the region's confidence. Much of that confidence is tied to how Japan deals with its World War II history in the region. It cannot meet the goal of cooperation when neighbors still fear militarism.

Those fears are also rooted in Japan's domestic politics. Strong Japanese political leadership—one that has gained the trust and confidence of the people by restructuring of the economy and reforming the political process—will then have the credibility to build a consensus of support for a less constrained military policy. Until then, military modernization and Constitutional revision are far too much to expect.

Furthermore, the rebuilding and strengthening of the Japanese economy before reunification is absolutely essential to both Korea and Japan. The immediate costs of reunification will be borne by Korea's neighbors. In the long run, successful reunification will be to strengthen the region's domestic economy and further secure its important global role. In the short run, reunification will mean refugees, massive humanitarian aid, a complete reordering of the political and economic infrastructure, some form of domestic peacekeeping, and major economic development investments that will not provide any significant fiscal return for years, perhaps decades. A Japan that is not economically strong enough to substantially contribute to that process will have two options. The first option is to endure the high costs and further weaken its domestic economy and political legitimacy. The second option is to attempt to isolate itself from the process, further weaken its regional legitimacy, and perhaps ultimately find itself excluded from the long-term economic benefits of successful reunification.

For China, meeting this challenge can be almost as complex a task as it will be for Japan. China's advantage is its existing ties with the two Koreas. This uniquely valuable position makes China crucial to this initial reunification process, reinforcing to other nations the importance of carefully sustaining a productive

diplomatic relationship with China. Carrying out this role also has domestic risks for China. The initial turmoil of reunification would be immediately felt in China. Economic refugees from North Korea's current economic crisis are already making their way to China in growing numbers. The increasing number of North Koreans requesting political asylum from foreign embassies in Beijing has created a serious political and diplomatic crisis. China walks a delicate tightrope with its own domestic hard-liners. Clearly it must do all that it can to prevent political and economic chaos in the two states on its borders. Of those two states, the regime most in need of change is its ideological ally while the other is one of its most important trading partners. Already struggling to maintain its own economic growth and internal political order, the rush of demands that will follow reunification will be difficult to absorb even for a nation as large as China.

But if China has much to lose it also has much to gain. The economic and political benefits of ensuring successful reunification would be both international and domestic. Through full participation and leadership—where and when it can best do so—in this process, China can provide for broader regional stability. This process will develop confidence-building measures and networks for future cooperation and conflict resolution. To be fully successful, however, China must join other nations in the region in resisting the temptation to dramatically alter the current military balance. For example, a unilateral buildup of troops to contend with economic refugees from North Korea would, at best, send mixed signal to other nations. Hard liners in the United States would be likely to rhetorically exploit such a move no

matter how logical it might be for the purposes of internal domestic order. Any change in the military balance as reunification draws near must be multilateral, transparent, and focused on humanitarian relief and peacekeeping.

For the United States, the keys to this process are continued dialogue and cooperation with China, continued incremental rather than dramatic revisions to Japan's security structure matched with dramatic rather than incremental revisions to Japan's economic structure, continued involvement in the dialogue between the two Koreas, and continued regional presence. This delicate balancing act is clearly made more difficult by China's tensions with Taiwan and the debate over missile defense, recurring battles with Japan over trade, and the notoriously mercurial leadership in North Korea. Other issues may cloud the regional picture at the margins. However, the peaceful reunification of Korea is the linchpin for long-term security and stability in the region. Those nations that fail to recognize this and fail to take part in the delicate, long-term process undermine the success of this important effort while dramatically diminishing any prospect for securing their own long-term interests in the region.

## NOTES

[1] Interviews in support of this research were conducted in Japan and Hong Kong during the summer of 2001. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the International Studies Association Conference in Hong Kong in July 2001 and at the Osaka University of Foreign Studies in August 2001. Thanks to Greg Beals, Peter Berton, Michael Bosak, Corinne Bridges, Susan Bryant, Victor Cha, Thomas Christensen, Robert Eldridge, Peter Fromm, Russell Howard, Seung-Ho Joo, C.S. Eliot Kang, Martin McGuire, Nozomu Nakaoka, Masashi Nishihara, Shinichi Ogawa, Pat Oyabe, Heigo Sato, Yoneyuki Sugita, Akio Watanabe, Al Wilner, and numerous

anonymous interview subjects as well as my students for their comments, questions, insights and sharp and valuable criticisms. The author also gratefully acknowledges the continuing research support provided by the Institute for National Security Studies of the United States Air Force Academy, the Dean's Faculty Development Fund of the United States Military Academy, and the Strategic Studies Institute of the United States Army War College.

[2] William Breer, "Japan's Contribution To The Campaign Against Terrorism," CSIS Japan Watch, October 18, 2001, http://www.csis.org/japan/japanwatch/jw0110.htm; "Japan anti-terror bill set for approval," CNN.com World, October 18, 2001, http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORL…pcf/east/10/18/ret.japan.bill/index.html; "Japan considers sending warships," CNN.com World, (November 1, 2001); "LDP: More freedom on use of weapons," *The Ashahi Shimbun*, November 10, 2001, http://www.asahi.com/english/international/K2001111000242.html; "MSDF ships head for anti-terror campaign," *The Asahi Shimbun*, November 26, 2001, http://www.asahi.com/english/international/K2001112600219.html.

[3] "Military action against suspicious ships leaves Japan shaken," CNN.com World, (March 24, 1999), http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9…M-Japan-Mystery Ships.ap/index.html; Masayuki Kitano, "Japan Coast Guard Chase, Sink Intruding Boat," Reuters, December 22, 2001, http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20011222/wl/japan_boat_dc_5.html; "Spy Ship Sinking Draws Muted Response," STRATFOR Strategic Forecasting Free Intelligence Briefing, January 3, 2002, http://www.stratfor.com/home/giu/archive/010302.htm; "Aegis warship to stay behind," *The Ashahi Shimbun*, November 1, 2001, http://www.asahi.com/english/international/K2001110100441.html.

[4] Masaru Tamamoto, "Tokyo's Peace and the American Agenda," *The New York Times*, July 1, 2001, A13; Jane Perlez, "Playing the Japan Card? Facing Down China Without Riling It Up," *The New York Times*, Week in Review, August 5, 2001, 5; Editorial, "Legacies of the Gulf War," *The Japan Times*, August 7, 2001, 18; Ilene R. Prusher, "War on terrorism challenges Japan's pacifism," *The Christian Science Monitor*, September 24, 2001, 7; Noriyuki Katagiri, "Japan's case for missile defense," *Japan Today*, February 26, 2002, http://www.japantoday.com/e/?content=commentary&id=154; Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, "Chinese Apprehensions About Revitalization Of The US-Japan Alliance," *Asian Survey* XXXVII, no. 4 (April 1997): 383-402; Tsuneo Akaha, "Beyond self-defense: Japan's elusive security role under the new Guidelines for

US-Japan Defense Cooperation," *The Pacific Review* 11, no. 4 (1998): 461-483.

[5] By "near term" I mean three to five years.

[6] The debate on the distinct qualities and advantages of conventional weapons over nuclear forces—both as deterrent and an offensive system—was a significant issue in American Cold War planning. For a discussion of this important aspect of the so-called "New Look," see Michael J. Meese, *Defense Decision Making Under Budget Stringency: Examining Downsizing in the United States Army*, Chapter III-"The Post Korean War Years," unpublished doctoral dissertation, (Princeton University, 2000); For a discussion of the value of conventional deterrence see John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); For study highlighting the specific issues of Theater Missile Defense (TMD) in the region, see Patrick M. O'Donogue, *Theater Missile Defense in Japan: Implications for the US—China—Japan Strategic Relationship*, Letort Paper Series Monographs (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 2000).

[7] This is hardly an original thought. See Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

[8] Jay M. Parker "Japan at Century's End: Climbing on China's Bandwagon?" *Pacific Focus* XV, No. 1 (Spring 2000): 14-15; Ann Scott Tyson, "A Culture of Cheap Industrial Junk," *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 3, 2001, 20; Ilene Prusher, "Well-ordered homelessness: life on Japan's Fringe," *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 14, 2001, 1, 8; David E. Sanger, "Bush Backs Japan's Economic Plans, Sidestepping 2 Disputes," *The New York Times*, July 1, 2001, A12; Paul Krugman, "A Leap In the Dark," *The New York Times*, July 8, 2001, Week in Review, 11.

[9] Parker, "Japan at Century's End," 8-14.

[10] Tae-Hwan Kwak, "The Korean Peace Process: Prospects for Peace Regime Building After the Summit," *International Journal of Korean Reunification Studies* 9, no.1 (2000); David Cohen, "Academics in South Korea Ponder a Future Tied Closely to the North," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, April 20, 2001, A60-61; Ilene R. Prusher, "South Koreans Wait for North to return the favor," *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 20, 2001, 7; Balbina Hwang, "The Bush Administration's Cautious Approach to North Korea," The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1455, July 6, 2001.

[11] Soeya Yoshihide, "Taiwan in Japan's Security Considerations," *The China Quarterly*, no. 165 (March 2001): 130-146.

[12] Russell D. Howard, "Discussion of 'The Chinese Security Concept and its Historical Evolution,'" *Journal of Contemporary China* 10, no. 27 (2001): 285-292; Parker, "Japan at Century's End," 25-28.

[13] For an excellent discussion of the philosophical and political dimensions of American civilian political control over military force, see Suzanne C. Nielsen, *Political Control Over The Use Of Force: A Clausewitzian Perspective*, Letort Paper Series Monographs (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 2000).

[14] Brian McAllister Linn, *Guardians of Empire: The US Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).

[15] Stephen Peter Rosen, "Strategic Traditions For The Asia-Pacific Region," *Naval War College Review* LIV, no. 1 (2001): 15-21.

[16] Examples of the classic realist literature in international relations theory include Hans J. Morganthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, sixth edition, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985). The most notable work on the subject in the Cold War literature is Kenneth Waltz's study of structural realism, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). For an overview of the current trends and developments in international relations theory, see Stephen M. Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1998): 29-44.

[17] Stephen M. Walt, *Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

[18] There are countless scholarly accounts of the origins of balance of power theory and the history of the classic European era from the Congress of Vienna through the outbreak of World War I. For an interesting account of the human as well as the strategic elements involved, see Barbara W. Tuchman, *The Guns of August* (New York: Macmillan, 1962).

[19] All this is not to say that the nations of East Asia—particularly China—have not skillfully practiced balance of power politics. Japan quickly adapted to the system after the Meiji Restoration, and by the turn of the century the Japanese were among the most skilled practitioners of systemic level balance of power. The Chinese showed particular skill after the end of the Cultural Revolution and the US and China began to reengage. Some of the most outstanding examples of balance of power can be seen in China during the Three

Kingdoms era, while both Korean and Japan also have clear examples of internal balancing. These domestic political examples, however, are not the same as systemic level balance of power politics exercised by unitary actor states on a global or regional level. The historic pattern of state-to-state behavior in Asia has not followed the same dynamic as the patterns seen in Europe. My thanks to Russ Howard for helping me to clarify this key point.

[20] Kimie Hara, "Rethinking the 'Cold War' in the Asia-Pacific," *The Pacific Review* 12, no. 4 (1999): 515-536; Seiichiro Takagi, "In Search of a Sustainable Equal Partnership: Japan-China Relations in the Post-Cold-War Era," *Japan Review of International Affairs* 13, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 17-38.

[21] Parker, "Korean Stability and the US-Japan-China Relationship," *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies* 9, no.1, (2000): 35-37. See also Gerald Segal, "Does China Matter?" *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 5 (September/October 1999): 24-36; Russell D. Howard, *The Chinese People's Liberation Army: "Short Arms and Slow Legs"*, (Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper 28, US Air Force Academy, Colorado, September 1999); Robert S. Ross, "The Geography of Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century," *International Security* 23, no. 4 (1999): 81-118; Howard, "Discussion of 'Chinese Security,'" Bates Gill and Evan S. Medeiros, "Foreign and Domestic Influences on China's Arms Control and Nonproliferation Policies," *The China Quarterly* (reprint, 2000).

[22] Parker, "Japan at Century's End," 5-33; _____, "Korean Stability and the US-Japan-China Relationship," *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies* 9, no. 1 (2000): 45-62.

[23] Ilene R. Prusher, "A history that Japan can't forget," *The Christian Science Monitor*, April 11, 2001, 1; Michael R. Baker, "Lingering distrust of Japan extends textbook row," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 20 July, 2001, 7; Michael Green, "The Forgotten Player," *The National Interest*, no. 60, summer 2000, 49; Reuters "Ghosts of war haunt Tokyo ties," *South China Morning Post*, July 25, 2001, 8; Li Baodong, "South Korea Tougher on Japanese Textbook Issue," *Beijing Review* 44, no. 30 (July 26, 2001), 9-10; " Editorial: 'Feelings' on Yasukuni issue threaten to jeopardize nation," *The Asahi Shimbun,* August 6, 2001, 26; Susumu Takahashi, "Interview: Dialogue needed to escape textbook morass," *The Asahi Shimbun*, August 6, 2001, 26; Nobuo Matsunaga, "Interview: Japan must understand suffering of S. Korea," *The Asahi Shimbun*, August 6, 2001, 26; "China cautions over history, stresses keeping peaceful ties," *The Japan Times*, August 6, 2001, 1; "Cover Story: 2001 Yasukuni," *The Asahi Shimbun*, August 7, 2001, 1; Taro Karasaki,

"Tokyo board defends text selection; activists furious," *The Asahi Shimbun*, August 8, 2001, 1; "China presses Yasukuni issue unofficially," *The Asahi Shimbun*, August 8, 2001, 1; "Ministers avoid Yasukuni controversy," *The Asahi Shimbun*, August 8, 2001, 1; Kanako Takahara and Toshi Maeda, "Yasukuni awaits as minefield for Koizumi," *The Japan Times*, August 10, 2001, 3; Robert Marquand, "Why the past still separates China and Japan," *The Christian Science Monitor*, August 20, 2001; "Editorial: Japan's two wars, two faces," *The Korea Herald*, December 22, 2001, http://www.koreaherald.co.kr…ata/html_dir/2001/12/12/200112120041.asp. See also Harold W. French, "An Outsider Teaches Japan About Itself," *The New York Times*, February 2, 2002, B7; Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, ed. *East Asian Security: An International Security Reader* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1996); and Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, ed. *East Asian Security*.

[24] John Nathan, "Profiles: Tokyo Story--Shintaro Ishihara's flamboyant nationalism appeals to many Japanese voters who are looking for a change in government" *The New Yorker*, April 9, 2001, 108-115; Herbert P. Bix, "Japan's New Nationalism," *The New York Times*, May 29, 2001, A15.

[25] Susan F. Bryant and Russell D. Howard, "Shrimp or Barracuda? Contemplating a Unified and Nuclear Capable Korea," *Nuclear Deterrence and Defense: Strategic Consideration*, James M. Smith, ed. (Colorado Springs: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001).

[26] My thanks to Shinichi Ogawa for helping to clarify the Japanese view of "collective defense" as opposed to "collective security."

[27] Green notes a number of dramatic events in the mid 1990's that seemed to stir some Japanese action on security, most notable among these the North Korean launch of the Taepodong Missile. Even with these events, Japanese public opinion still does not endorse Constitutional revision or substantial modernization of the military. Furthermore, even this increased attention from political leaders in the absence of public support has done little to stir concrete policy action beyond a combination of cautious moves toward closer ties to the US security umbrella and a tentative but clear attempt to accommodate China. Green, "Forgotten Player," ibid; In Green's latest book, *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power*, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), he notes

that while no alternative strategic visions to existing US dependent foreign policies have emerged, Japan is moving in a more independent, Japan focused direction than has previously been evident. See also Parker, "Japan at Century's End."

[28] Ilene R. Prusher, "Well-ordered homelessness: life on Japan's fringe," *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 14, 2001, 1; Marie Anchordoguy, "Will Japan's sun rise with Koizumi," *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 21, 2001, 9; Ilene R. Prusher, "Koizumi's popularity rubs off," *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 26, 2001, 6; Hana Kusumoto, "In Japan, a leader whose words work wonders…", *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 27, 2001, 7; David R. Francis, "Japan tries to fan growth, and avert global recession," *The Christian Science Monitor*, August 20, 2001, 17; "Japan Sinks; Koizumi Soars," STRATFOR Strategic Forecasting Free Intelligence Bulletin, October 31, 2001, http://www.stratfor.com/home/giu/archive/102101.htm; Ken Belson, "Themes of Gloom and Doom Fill Japanese Bookstores," *The New York Times*, November 19, 2001, C10; James Brooke, "Recession Saps Consumer Confidence in Japan," *The New York Times*, December 6, 2001, A3; Yumiko Ono, "As Slide Drags On, Japan Inc. Sacrifices Its Youngest Workers," *The Wall Street Journal*, December 19, 2001, 1; Takashi Oka, "Japan's Economic 'High Noon,'" *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 7, 2001, 9; Howard W. French, "After Firing, The Fallout: Japan's Chief Stumbles," *The New York Times*, February 2, 2002; Ilene R. Prusher, "Will PM's reforms save Japan?" *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 28, 2002, 6.

[29] Howard, "Discussion of 'Chinese Security;'" Gill and Medeiros, "Foreign and Domestic Influences on China's Arms Control;" Parker, "Korean Stability," 35-37; Sheldon Simon, "Alternative Visions of Security in the Asia Pacific," *Pacific Affairs* 69, no.3 (Fall 1996): 386-388; Fei-Ling Wang, "To Incorporate China," *The Washington Quarterly* 21, no. 1, (1997); David Shambaugh, "China's Military Views the World: Ambivalent Security," *International Security* 24, no. 3 (1999/2000); Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the US-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," *International Security* 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999); Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 5 (September/October 1996); Alastair Ian Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Ross, "Geography of Peace."

[30] Masaru Tamamoto, "Tokyo's Peace and the American Agenda," *The New York Times*, Week in Review July 1, 2001, 13. For a proposal for great multilateral action more closely aligned with my

views than Tamamoto's see Paul Dibb, "Strategic Trends: Asia at the Crossroads," *Naval War College Review* LIV, no. 1 (2001): 22-38.

[31] Parker, "Japan at Century's End."

[32] Green, "Forgotten Player."

[33] Ilene R. Prusher, "South Koreans wait for North to return the favor," *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 20, 2001, 7; "S. Korea favors renewed ties between Russia, North Korea," *The Japan Times*, August 6, 2001, 3; Don Kirk, "North's Reversal on GIs Jolts Seoul: Pullout Urged at Moscow Summit," *International Herald Tribune/ The Asahi Shimbun*, August 7, 2001, 1; James Brooke, "South Korea and Japan Begin to Sweat After Bush Turns Up the Heat on North Korea," *The New York Times*, January 31, 2002, A12.

[34] Robert Marquand, "China nudges North Korea toward the outside world," *The Christian Science Monitor*, September 6, 2001, 7; Parker, "Korean Stability."

[35] Neil King, Jr., "U.S., China Resume Business as Usual," *The Asian Wall Street Journal*, July 27-29, 2001, 12; Ann Scott Tyson, "US, China cautiously rekindle military ties," *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 20, 2002, 2.